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quiescence in the use of the fish trap. They relied heavily on that implied
promise. They may now suffer detriment due to the application of the
state fish trap law applied by reason of this transition from federal to state
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court should have applied the equitable prin-
ciple of estoppel to their case. Moreover, the Court should be ready to
apply it liberally in the future as well.
Felix S. Cohen, one great Indian champion, after the Alcea'81 decision
was rendered, expressed the hope that doubt would no longer exist as to
whether the Indians would receive compensation for governmental taking
of their lands. In that case, the Indians were compensated for a govern-
mental taking of lands claimed solely on the basis of an unrecognized
aboriginal title.'l 2 Mr. Cohen's hope was arguably shattered by the Court
in the Tee-Hit-Ton case. 183
Once more we see a glimmer of hope that the Court will not sit sterile
and mute when the rights of Indians are placed in the judicial frying pan.
Vigorous application of an expanded Metlakatla precedent may proscribe
deprivations by state governments, whether garbed in the clothing of the
police power or whatever. The present Court has shown an acute aware-
ness and willingness to protect the individual from unreasonable and un-
fair state action. One would hope it would turn this same awareness and
virility on the Indian problem in this period of transition from federal to
state control. A change of engineers should not make the train run on a
different track. The application of equitable estoppel to these problems
could only serve to enhance this Nation's stature; to revitalize our na-
tional conscience as to these first Americans; and to further the principles
of justice to which this country is eternally pledged.
L. Bow Pritchett, Jr.
181 United States v. Alcea Band of Tillarnooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
182 Ibid.
183 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
A FEDERAL WIRETAP LAW-NEEDED WEAPON
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
INTRODUCTION
A crime syndicate is an organization of criminals which, by the sys-
tematic utilization of violence, intimidation, bribery and political influ-
ence, controls a vast domain of illegal, quasi-legal and legitimate activities
yielding enormous profits. There is a diversity of opinion as to whether
organized crime holds its powerful sway by a single, nationwide system,
. COMMENTS
or by a loosely joined federation of regional syndicates. Recent sensa-
tional disclosures of the sinister machinations of organized crime are
shocking a complacent public from a lethargy which has bordered upon
apathy.' The existence of syndicated crime is no longer seriously doubted.
Startling revelations are only now, however, dispersing the pall of secrecy
that has so long veiled organized crime. For the first time, the full range,
depth and ramifications of syndicated criminal activities are being pre-
sented to an amazed Congress and an astounded citizenry.
The analogy of a complex, smoothly conducted economic enterprise
complete with competent personnel performing diversified but integrated
functions is particularly apposite when considering organized crime. The
modern archcriminal conveys an image of respectability. He dresses fash-
ionably, eschews violence and carries on his illegal operations behind the
screen of a legitimate business. He employs top-caliber counsel, tax ex-
perts and other professional help. The end result is that the enormous
revenues from gambling, prostitution, narcotics and racketeering are chan-
neled to syndicate chieftains without any traceable connection between
the overlords of organized crime and their minions engaged in these ne-
farious activities.
Previous attacks on organized crime have been on a piecemeal basis,
seriously hampered by the multiplicity of law enforcement agencies,
jurisdictional limitations and disputes, and the wide dissimilarity of state
and federal laws. The harsh glare of publicity on the pernicious operations
of syndicated crime augurs a popular clamor for more efficient criminal
justice. By its carcinomatous growth into new areas of influence, organ-
ized crime poses a peril of the first magnitude to American social, eco-
nomic and political institutions. While government measures against or-
ganized crime have been accelerated by new legislation 2 and extended
jurisdiction of federal authorities, no definite effort is being made to equip
federal law enforcement agencies with the essential legal weapons crucial
to the successful outcome of a decisive campaign.
1 The widely publicized disclosures of Joseph Valachi, the convicted syndicate mem-
ber.
2 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a),(b) (1958). This is the so-called Travel Bill aimed especially at
organized crime by its provisions: "(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign com-
merce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with
the intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any
crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying
on of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the
acts specified in (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity' means
(1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax
has not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the
State in which they are committed or of the United States .... "
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The paucity of convictions of syndicate leaders is the most abject fail-
ure of criminal justice. The need to revamp existing laws to deal more
effectively with rapidly increasing crime rates in general, and organized
crime in particular, is becoming imperative. Foremost among the new
weapons urged to reduce the marked disparity between efficient law en-
forcement and syndicated crime is legalized wiretapping. Reasons why
this highly controversial technique of crime prevention and detection
should be adopted to aid in the containment of organized crime will now
be examined.
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED WIRETAPPING
The seriousness of the threat of organized crime to American society is
not yet fully realized by the general public. Unfortunately, public aware-
ness of danger cannot, like morality, be legislated. Syndicated crime, al-
though it shuns publicity, has shown a phenomenal ability to survive
exposure by congressional committees, state legislatures, crime commis-
sions, prosecutors, grand juries, and crusading newspapers. The popular
interest in organized crime is sporadic and fluctuating. Expos6s cause only
temporary inconvenience to syndicated crime in the form of suspended
or shifted operations. In an incredibly short time, new forms of illegal
activity are developed, or the illicit operations are resumed, often in the
very places where they were first uncovered.3 By the ruthless employment
of bribery and intimidation, its two mainstays of control, syndicated
crime has built a colossal criminal empire. The experience of the past
three decades has proven conclusively that huge criminal combinations
cannot be crushed by isolated and uncoordinated local law enforcement
agencies. 4 It must be conceded that local law enforcement, however effi-
cient, must have federal assistance to combat syndicated crime, especially
where criminal activities are spread over several states.
Significant current federal efforts directed against the illicit operations
of organized crime are only beginning. Progress has been disappointingly
slow,5 and candor requires the conclusion that to date, no appreciable in-
roads into organized crime have been made. The prognosis for the appre-
hension and imprisonment of syndicate leaders in the near future remains
doubtful at best. The conclusion becomes increasingly manifest that pres-
ent federal laws are either grossly inadequate to cope with organized
crime, or, negatively, that they unduly restrict law enforcement officers
in their attempts to combat syndicate operations. Certain prominent offi-
3 CooK, A Two-DoLLAR BET MEANS MURDER (1960).
4 Combating Organized Crime, 347 ANNALS 97 (1963).
5Id. at 103.
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cials have called for new federal laws permitting wiretapping to end this
material disadvantage.6
The most powerful and versatile single countermeasure readily available
for a terminal struggle with syndicated crime is legalized wiretapping.
Only such a law can make possible an effective three-pronged attack on
organized crime with the objectives of:
(1) Conviction of syndicate leaders at all levels of organized crime.
(2) Curtailment of enormous syndicate profits.
(3) Crippling of the communications of organized crime by neutralization of
its most widely used facility.
It is elementary that any drive to destroy syndicated crime must first
extinguish the tremendous flow of illicit revenues which makes possible
the maintenance, protection and government of its huge organization.
Prostitution, gambling, narcotics and racketeering, even in their more so-
phisticated modern variations, are all peculiarly vulnerable to exposure by
wiretapping. Legal interception of telephone communications by law en-
forcement agencies would make possible the detection, surveillance and
prosecution of these illegal activities on a scale never before possible.
Secondly, the extremely formidable obstacle of linking the leaders of or-
ganized crime to actual syndicate operations would be much easier to
overcome. Thirdly, bribery, corruption of police and political officials,
extortion, intimidation, perjury and obstruction of justice, all of which
are the necessary concomitants of daily syndicate functions, would all be
susceptible to discovery and prosecution. Other legislation aimed at ex-
tending federal jurisdiction over typical operations of organized crime
would be greatly implemented in that infractions would be rendered
markedly easier to prove by resort to wiretap evidence. 7 Vigorous law
6 Advocates of legalized wiretapping include Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
and Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy of New York City, The Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 26, 1963, p. 3, col. 2. Edward S. Silver, District Attorney of Kings
County (Brooklyn), N.Y., said: "Many crimes have been solved because of information
gained from wiretaps." The Chicago Tribune, Aug. 13, 1963, p. 4, col. 2. Frank Hogan,
former District Attorney of New York County, has stated that without the availability
of such evidence gathering techniques as wiretapping, the convictions of an imposing
list of organization leaders, including Charles "Lucky" Luciano, Johnny "Dio' Dio-
guardi, and Joe "Adonis" Doto would have been impossible. Washington Post, May 12,
1962, p. A5.
7 For example, under the so-called Travel Bill, 18 U.S.C. S 1952 (a),(b) (1958), it
appears that four major elements must be established in a prosecution under this
statute: (1) That the accused travelled or used a facility (this might include telegraph,
telephone, radio, railroad, bus or other form of transportation) in interstate commerce;
(2) That the accused in travelling or using such facility intended to distribute the pro-
ceeds, commit a crime of violence, or perform other acts which facilitate the conduct
of a business enterprise; (3) That the business enterprise facilitated by such acts in-
volved a form of gambling (or other enumerated activity) illegal in the state where
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enforcement by federal officials, whose responsibility and integrity com-
mand respect, would awaken a hitherto indifferent public to its obliga-
tions. State and local law officers, instead of having their morale destroyed
by continual frustration of their efforts against organized crime, would
gain fresh inspiration and renewed motivation to discharge their duties.
The controversy over legalized wiretapping is characterized by a war of
cliches. Wiretapping by law enforcement officials is hailed as a boon and
cursed as a bane; it is praised as a panacea, and proscribed as a poison.
Realization that the true value of such a counterstroke against organized
crime is somewhere between these extremes accounts for the perceptible
reversal in the climate of opinion on this heatedly debated subject. The
failure of past legislative measures and the acknowledged expansion of
underworld power are forcing a reluctant recognition that syndicated
crime poses a unique problem sufficient not only to endanger national in-
stitutions, but to challenge the very resources of the government itself.
Such a candid appraisal is the most demonstrative reminder that the
balance of criminal jurisprudence is dynamic. Advocates of legalized wire-
tapping do not contend that it can be employed without some danger
and sacrifice. Legalized wiretapping is too often dismissed as "odious,"
"unethical," "dirty business," or "a bad means to a good end." What is
lost sight of, in the exchange of verbiage, is that the adequacies of laws
and their protections must be continually interpreted in terms of the state
of society and the social conditions which they are to govern. Much legal
advertence is properly devoted to the protection of human rights. What
is often forgotten is that an intelligent balance must be maintained be-
tween the rights of the accused, on the one hand, and the need of the
society to protect itself by convicting and punishing criminals, on the
other. If the scales of criminal justice get too far out of equilibrium, the
result is either the impairment of individual freedom, or the weakening
of the very foundations of society by allowing criminals to become too
powerful. Obviously, no society can exist if crime threatens to overwhelm
it. The increasing alarm of eminent law officials over the untrammeled
activities of syndicated crime is grounded on the knowledge that utter
contempt and disregard for the law have always been the basic creed of
organized crime. If the only reasonable alternative to the supremacy of
organized crime over existing political and legal institutions is the inva-
sion of a relatively minor right such as privacy, the weighing of the in-
terests seems clearly justifiable and prudent.
committed or under federal law; (4) That the accused, after travelling or using a
facility in interstate commerce, committed or attempted to commit one of the pro-
scribed acts in furtherance of such business.
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THE PRESENT STATUS OF LEGALIZED WIRETAPPING
The Federal Courts
The Benanti case8 remains the latest word of the United States Supreme
Court on wiretapping. 9 It is the furthest extension and clarification of
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.' 0 First, it prohibits, un-
der any circumstances," the introduction of any evidence in a federal
criminal proceeding which has been obtained by wiretapping. Secondly,
Benanti makes wiretapping by state officers a federal offense in that it
violates Section 605, notwithstanding the fact that the officials are oper-
8 355 U.S. 96 (1957). 9 See Note, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 159 (1962).
10 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as section 605).
11 However, this exclusion is only relatively absolute. There are two important ex-
ceptions. The first is rather obvious. Evidence of wiretapping is admissible in a prose-
cution of one who is alleged to have violated the Federal Communications Act by en-
gaging in the wiretapping in question. Second, that facts have been improperly learned
by wiretapping does not render them automatically inadmissible in a federal criminal
prosecution if knowledge of them has been gained from an independent source. Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). In Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265
(1960), although a wiretap by state officers on the defendant's telephone prompted in-
formation which led to the calling of the defendant before a grand jury (county), ad-
missions made by the defendant in the course of state investigations were allowed to be
used in his subsequent denaturalization proceeding, where those admissions were not
made because the defendant's telephone was tapped, but because he realized that state
officials had for some time been in possession of the facts regarding which they ques-
tioned him.
The fact that co-conspirators accused of a federal offense are induced to turn state's
evidence by confronting them with the incriminating contents of telephone messages
unlawfully intercepted (under section 605) by federal officers does not make their testi-
mony inadmissible as evidence against other co-conspirators not parties to the inter-
cepted messages where the testimony is not confined to facts within the knowledge of
the witnesses and does not refer in any way either to the existence or contents of the
intercepted messages. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1943).
A defendant in a criminal case who asserts that evidence against him was improperly
obtained by wiretapping has the burden of proving to the trial court's satisfaction the
truth of the assertion. Nardone v. United States, supra. In interpreting this rule as to
the burden, no "fishing expeditions" are allowed, and the defense, with a mere aver-
ment that wiretapping has taken place, is not entitled to examine evidence which has
not yet been introduced by the prosecution to determine whether or not such was the
case. This is true especially where the prosecution denies use of such an unlawful
means. Nevertheless, federal courts have still ruled where the defense in the first in-
stance shows that wiretapping has been used, the burden then passes to the prosecution
to show that such wiretapping has not furnished the clues which led to the prosecution.
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (1950), cert. denied 342 U.S. 920 (1952). Once it
is established that wiretapping has taken place, in meeting the burden shifted to it, the
prosecution must show that such wiretapping did not lead to evidence introduced. In
sustaining this burden, the prosecution must disclose the nature of such wiretap evi-
dence not only to the trial judge, but also to the accused, since the accused must be
given the oportunity to meet and dispel the prima facie case which otherwise would be
made against him.
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ating under the authority of a state law and pursuant to an order of a state
court. Thirdly, the very divulgence of wiretap information before a jury
(petit or grand) constitutes a separate offense under Section 605 as inter-
preted by the Court. Finally, in its sternest admonition to states allowing
legalized wiretapping, the Supreme Court warns that "Congress, in setting
out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow legislation which
would contradict that section and that policy.' u 2 State officers using le-
galized wiretapping are thus put in the extremely awkward position of
overtly breaking federal law both when making interceptions and when
disclosing the data obtained. There are strong indications that the tradi-
tional reluctance of the federal courts to intervene in state criminal pro-
ceedings may not be relied on by state courts where an important interest
is involved.18
The famous case of Mapp v. Ohio14 holds that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment of the federal
constitution is,' by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.15
Coming only four months after the Supreme Court refused to enjoin the
use of wiretap evidence in a New York state criminal trial, the impact of
Mapp on legalized wiretapping is the subject of sharp judicial disagree-
ment.16
In states having legislation allowing wiretapping by police officers,
Mapp aggravates the ominous warning contained in Benanti v. United
States17 by specifically overruling the two important wiretap precedent
cases of Wolf v. Colorado's and People v. Defore.19 The full significance
12Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 105, 106 (1957).
18 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Stefanelli v. Minard, 343 U.S. 117
(1951), are precedents for the traditional reluctance of federal courts to interfere col-
laterally in state criminal proceedings.
14367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15 Id. at 655.
16 In Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), a federal court refused to enjoin the
use of evidence obtained by wiretapping pursuant to a court order in a New York state
criminal trial. While conceding that section 605 would be violated by the reception of
such evidence, the federal court affirmed denial of the injunction sought citing
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), and Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951),
as authority. In a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed de-
nial of the injunction citing the same cases as controlling.
1T355 U.S. 96, 105, 106 (1957).
18 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf case holds that evidence obtained by a state officer
by means which constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the fourth amendment
to the Constitution is nevertheless admissible in a state court.
19 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). The Defore case ruled that decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States construing the fourth and fifth amendments of the
Constitution are not binding on state courts, and that a state may make its own rules as
to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
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of the rejection of Wolf is that it had served as the key precedent for the
even more eminent wiretap precedent case of Schwartz v. Texas.20 In the
Schwartz case, the Supreme Court said that wiretap data could be intro-
duced into evidence in a state criminal trial even though it violated Section
605 pursuant to the rule of Wolf v. Colorado, holding that evidence, al-
though obtained by a state officer through an unlawful search and seizure,
is nevertheless admissible in a state court.21 Thus, the signal importance
of Mapp v. Ohio in connection with wiretapping is that, by its rejection
of the Wolf and Defore cases, it compromises the authority of Schwartz
(practically the sole remaining principal precedent for wiretapping). It is
little wonder that even in the few states allowing wiretapping, there are
some judges who refuse to issue orders granting permission to intercept
telephone messages, holding that Benanti and Mapp bar wiretap evidence
from state courts as a matter of law. 22 Only the consideration of another
case by the United States Supreme Court distinguishing the Schwartz,
Benanti and Mapp decisions, can solve the intricate puzzle posed by the
holdings of these three cases.
Several recent cases prominently featuring the use of electronic devices
serve to spark the wiretap controversy. Although decided on the rationale
of the Rathbun case,23 these decisions highlight the increased use of elec-
tronic aids by federal authorities in obtaining essential evidence. In Carbo
v. United States,24 three different types of electronic equipment were used
in securing the evidence leading to the conviction of the defendants for
extortion affecting interstate commerce, and for the interstate transmission
of threats.2 5 A recording of a threatening telephone conversation was
made by police with the consent of the receiver by placing an induction
coil beside the receiver's home telephone. The federal court held that this
recording was not in violation of Section 605 relating to the unauthorized
publication or use of a telephone conversation. 26 Threats made by one of
the co-defendants to the complaining witness were recorded on a minia-
ture wire-recording device known as a "Minifon." On another occasion, a
20 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
211d. at 201.
22 See the dissents in People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y. 2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689 (1962).
23 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Rathbun case holds that listening in on a regular exten-
sion line is not wiretapping.
24314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
25 18 U.S.C. S 875 (b) (1958) which reads as follows: "'Whoever, with the intent to
extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing
of value, transmits in interstate commerce any communication containing any threat
to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both."
2 6 Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 739 (9th Cir. 1963).
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small transmitter was concealed on the person of the prosecuting witness,
which was connected to a receiver in an adjoining room, where police
recorded additional threats. Recordings from all three devices were ad-
mitted into evidence over the objections of the defense that they consti-
tuted a violation of Section 605.
In United States v. Williams,27 a tape recording of telephone conversa-
tions between the defendant and an informer did not constitute intercep-
tion within the meaning of Section 605, and there was no violation of the
fourth amendment or due process where the informer permitted the re-
cording and the use of a memorandum from it to refresh the recollection
of a Narcotics agent who took the recording.
In Wilson v. United States,28 an agent of the Narcotics Bureau used a
device available to the public known as a "Twinfone." This electronic
aid, when attached to the receiver of a telephone, automatically creates
an extension. A recording of a conversation leading to the sale of narcotics
was made, and later admitted into evidence. On the basis of the reasoning
in the Rathbun case, 29 testimony as to a telephone conversation overheard
with the consent of only one of the parties does not constitute an inter-
ception within the prohibitions of Section 605, and such testimony does
not become inadmissable merely because it is recorded by or overheard
by an electronic or mechanical device attached to an extension telephone
or to telephone wiring at the locality of the consenting party.
Rathbun continues to be prominent in the area of electronic evidence
for three major principles.8 0 First, Section 605 is interpreted as safeguard-
ing the means of communication rather than rendering the communica-
tion itself privileged. Thus, one party cannot bind the other to secrecy
merely by using the telephone. Second, the consent of each party to a
conversation does not have to be obtained for divulgence, but it may be
disclosed with only the consent of one of the parties. Third, such testi-
mony does not become inadmissible simply because it was recorded by
using an extension telephone or by utilization of an electrical device at-
tached to the receiver, so long as the receiving party's consent has been
obtained. Where eavesdropping has been approved in these cases, the sig-
nificant fact is that a third person is listening to a conversation directly, or
indirectly through use of an electrical device, with the consent, and often,
the assistance, of one of the parties, and that the other party does not
know that his conversation is being overheard. Both the consenting party
27311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1963).
28316 F.2d 212 (1963).
29355 U.S. 107 (1957).
30 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Carnes v. United States, 295 F.2d
602 (5th Cit. 1961); Hall v. United States, 308 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1963).
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and the third party are free to divulge the contents of the conversation in
a courtroom or elsewhere. The only function being served by recording
is to preserve a permanent and accurate record of the conversation and
thus furnish more trustworthy evidence.31
The State Courts
The majority of states have legislation which prohibits wiretapping
entirely 32 or, with certain exceptions, such as that which is accidental and
incidental to the normal operation of the public utility.33 A few states will
allow wiretapping when there is consent of one or both parties. 34 How-
ever, since many of the states have passed the applicable statutes for the
protection of their public utilities, the criminal character of the legisla-
tion is at least questionable.3 5 Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, Texas, Vermont and Washington have no discernible legislation
covering wiretapping. The District of Columbia is governed by Section
605.
Five states have considered the many problems involved in legalizing
wiretapping and have passed laws allowing interception of telephone com-
munications under certain conditions.3 6 The legislative intent, in these ju-
risdictions, has been to permit law enforcement authorities to employ
wiretapping in fighting crime, and, at the same time, insure that the right
of privacy of the individual receives the maximum protection possible.37
Under a typical statute, permission to intercept telephone conversations
by wiretap can only be obtained by application for an ex parte order from
a judge after a good cause for wiretapping is shown. The person who is
to be the subject of telephone eavesdropping must be particularly de-
scribed, and the number of the telephone given. The order is generally
effective for two months, but it may be extended upon proper application.
31 Carnes v. United States, 295 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1961).
32 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 13-886 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE ch. 15, § 591, ch. 2,
§ 640 (1959); DEL. CODE ch. 3, S 757 (1953); IOWA CODE ch. 716, § 8 (1950); MICH. STAT.
ch. 286a, § 28.808 (1954); N. J. STAT. ch. 170, § 63 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ch. 69, § 1757
(1951); Wis. STAT. ch. 134, § 39 (1957) (telegraph only).
33N. C. GEN. STAT. ch. 14, § 155 (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 165 §§ 510, 540
(1955); Mo. CODE art. 35, § 93 (1957); PA. STAT. ch. 43, § 2443 (1958).
3 4 MD. CODE art. 35, § 93 (1957); PA. STAT. ch. 43, § 2443 (1958).
35 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ch. 67, § 18-6705 (1947); NEBaR. REv. STAT. ch. 86, § 328 (1943);
TENN. CODE ch. 45, §§ 39-4533, 65-2117 (1956); WYO. STAT. tit. 37, ch. 9, § 259 (1957).
36 Mn. CODE art. 35, § 94 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1962); NEv.
REv. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 200, § 660 (1957); N. Y. CODE OF CR. PROC. § 813-a (Supp. 1962);
ORE. REv. STAT. tit. 14, ch. 141, § 720 (1959).
37 It must be admitted that there are few convictions under these statutes. One such
instance was that of a private detective. People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E. 2d
817 (1959).
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All the acts describe the particular circumstances under which tele-
phone messages may be intercepted. The officer seeking the authority for
wiretapping must make a showing that a crime has been, or is about to be
committed, and that evidence will be obtained that will probably result in
either the solution or prevention of such crime. The statute of Maryland
has superior features in that it contains the most safeguards against abuse.
It rules out "fishing expeditions" by requiring an affirmation that the in-
terception affords the only available means of obtaining essential informa-
tion, and that all other alternatives have failed. In addition, the Maryland
statute provides that evidence obtained other than by the procedures de-
scribed under the act shall not be admissible in a state criminal proceed-
ing, including, of course, evidence obtained without a court order. The
other permissive jurisdictions are less stringent.
Federal Law v. State Law
The Benanti case38 makes wiretap evidence inadmissible in a federal
court and makes wiretapping a federal crime both by the interception of
the conversation and by its divulgence after the illegal interception. In
stating that Congressional intent was not meant to be frustrated by state
legislation authorizing wiretapping, the United States Supreme Court has
strongly indicated that a future decision by it may impose a similar exclu-
sionary rule on state criminal proceedings. The Mapp case8 9 reinforces
such conjecture by demolishing state laws holding that the states are free
to make their own laws regarding the admissibility of evidence procured
in violation of the federal constitution. Efforts to extend Mapp by analogy
account for the present confusion regarding the status of state laws allow-
ing wiretapping. In Williams v. Ball,40 one federal court has rejected the
application of the Mapp verdict to state rules permitting wiretap evidence
to be used in state courts. 41 In the Williams case, the conduct sought to be
enjoined by exclusion was not expressly forbidden by the federal consti-
tution, but merely by federal statutory law. However, in the Mapp case,
the conduct found reprehensible was clearly in violation of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, and was, therefore, within
the control of the Supreme Court by virtue of the fact that compliance
by federal officers and federal courts can be compelled. While the Su-
preme Court has impliedly disapproved of the admission of wiretap evi-
dence in a state criminal trial, there has not been, as yet, an express rejec-
tion in the form of a decision. Consequently, the federal courts have
hesitated to extend Mapp by implication to exclude such evidence. An-
other decision which will either extend the Benanti case or soften it by
38 355 U.S. 96 (1957). 40 294 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1961).
39 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 41 Id. at 96.
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limitation seems to be required to resolve the embarrassing situation of
prohibiting violations of the federal constitution, but allowing statutory
abridgments with impunity.
Meanwhile, states allowing legal wiretapping cling tenaciously to their
laws. A few cases have specifically held that the Benanti and Schwartz
cases allow the use of wiretap evidence in a state court, and that while
Section 605 may technically be violated, it does not act as a bar where
state rules of evidence allow such data to be admitted. 42 Such conflicting
positions reduce to extreme uncertainty the present status of cases featur-
ing wiretap evidence which has been obtained under a state law.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Syndicated crime presents a very real and imminent danger to American
social, economic, and political institutions, and even to government itself.
The unchecked growth of organized crime attests the general enfeeble-
ment of law enforcement at all levels, and the urgent need for new legal
weapons to fight criminals and methods which have clearly outpaced ex-
isting techniques of crime containment. Available procedures against crimi-
nals must be modified and strengthened to cope much more effectively
with the peculiar problems inherent in syndicated crime. Certainly a
threat comparable to the Communist menace calls for a hard and realistic
scrutiny of existing rules of criminal procedure and evidence. The growth
of organized crime to its present proportions would have been impossible
without the jurisdictional limitations and disputes that have vitiated past
attempts to deal with it. The federal government has taken token steps to
curtail syndicated criminal activity, but no real damage has been sus-
tained by organized crime. Despite apparent Congressional concern, no
legal weapons capable of inflicting mortal blows to syndicated crime have
been placed in the hands of federal law enforcement agencies.
Because of the reputation for honesty and integrity enjoyed by federal
law enforcement officers, the public has high expectations for the success
of the struggle against syndicated crime. A legalized wiretapping law is
the easiest and quickest weapon available to federal agencies capable of
producing the desired results. Such a law is urgently needed to restore the
42 In Lebowich v. O'Connor, 309 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1962), appellant, on trial in New
York for a criminal charge, sought a declaratory judgment that the district attorney of
New York had violated his oath of office by tapping the appellant's telephone line. In
dismissing, the Court cited Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), and People v.
Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N..2d 689 (1962). See also People v. Wagman, 31 Misc. 2d
505, 221 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1961). Defendant was prosecuted on charges of
conspiracy and bribery of basketball players. On his motion for inspection of grand
jury minutes, suppression of evidence and other relief, the Court said in denying the
motion that wiretap evidence is not inadmissible on the ground that it violates the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The court specifically held that
Mapp v. Ohio does not overrule People v. Dinan.
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balance of criminal justice, and to stop the erosion of the very foundations
of the American legal system by organized crime. Such legislation would
not be a wonderworker in itself. It would not serve to shortcut or elimi-
nate the need for dedicated law officers and good police methods.
Legislation permitting wiretapping by police officers must be drafted
carefully so as to afford the maximum protection of the right of privacy
of individuals and yet achieve the goal of the exposure of syndicated
crime. Such draftsmanship is a formidable, but not insuperable task.
Vigorous law enforcement and a marked increase in the number of con-
victions of syndicate leaders at all levels will do much to dissipate public
laxity toward law and to recapture respect for authority. The long reign
of corrupt police officers and public officials will come to an end; they
will be replaced by competent, honest men who have been frustrated far
too long by the intrenched regime of bribery and intimidation.
The argument that a federal wiretap law will mark the beginning of a
police state and open the floodgates of abuse is essentially fallacious be-
cause it is a non sequitur. It is typical of the morally deadlocked school
of thinking that has imbued syndicated crime with an aura of unchal-
lenged power bordering upon invincibility. It would discard as unwork-
able the first promise of a weapon capable of inflicting genuine and lasting
damage to organized crime because it would render the relation between
law enforcement authorities and criminals less sporting. It ignores without
consideration the absurd situation of increasing pressure on authorities for
convictions, yet withholding from these officials one of the few instru-
mentalities versatile enough to achieve the desired results.
Increasing national crime rates and the expansion of organized crime
into new fields call for an end to the procrastination and indecision of
Congress. Compared to the herculean tasks of passing uniform anti-syndi-
cated crime laws in all of the states, or to the need for nationwide reorgan-
ization of law enforcement agencies to overcome fragmentation, duplica-
tion, disputes and competition, legalized wiretapping is much easier and
practical, and above all, it can be done quickly. Congress should express
its alarm and solicitude over the dangerous power of organized crime by
striking a decisive blow against it rather than by passing more piecemeal
legislation which merely postpones coming to grips with the real prob-
lem. A federal law authorizing wiretapping is needed now. Such legisla-
tion can always be amended or repealed if abuses become genuine
problems instead of mere doctrinaire objections. A federal act allowing
wiretapping by federal law enforcement officers pursuant to an ex parte
application to a federal court and providing that evidence obtained as a
result shall be admissible in federal courts should be given a trial.
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